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Introduction
There have been long-standing concerns that regulation and `red tape' constitute
excessive burdens on the small business sector (Fairman and Yapp, 2005; Sommers
and Cole, 1985; van Stel and Stunnenberg, 2006). The view that excessive regulation
stifles enterprise and constrains business growth is common across developed economies
(Garibaldi et al, 2003; Massey, 2003; OECD, 2001; World Bank Group, 2006). Early
concerns about excessive regulation focused on the effect of red tape in constraining small
business growth. In the UK, three parliamentary white papers published between 1985 and
1988 signalled the Conservative government's intention to reduce the administrative
requirements of business in order to `` release enterprise'' from the `` burdens'' of bureau-
cracy (DTI, 1985; HMSO, 1986; 1988). Since 1997, the New Labour government has
continued the commitment towards minimising bureaucracy in the belief that it constrains
private enterprise, establishing the Better Regulation Task Force, now the Better Regula-
tion Commission, and the Cabinet Office Better Regulation Executive. Despite these
efforts, concerns remain focused on the disproportionate costs to small firms in comply-
ing with regulatory and administrative demands (Chittenden et al, 2003). Research
suggests the existence of `` severe diseconomies of scale'' (Bennett, 2006, page 53) for small
firms whose compliance costs are estimated to be between two and ten times higher than
large firms as costs per employee (Cressy, 2000; Poutziouris et al, 2003).
Set against this broad context of concern regarding excessive regulation has been
an apparently conflicting policy development which has sought to extend employment
rights and to better align workplace regulation with prevailing concerns regarding
work ^ life balance. In July 2004 the government announced a five-year strategy docu-
ment, the implementation of which commenced with the Work and Families Act
(OPSI, 2006). This is the latest in a stream of employment law reform that has included
the introduction of working time regulations (1998), a national minimum wage (1999),
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maternity and parental leave regulations (1999), and the part-time workers (prevention
of less favourable treatment) regulations (2000). As has previously occurred when
employee entitlements have been extended, concerns were expressed by business lobby
groups and employers organisations whose objections, often underpinned by neoliberal
views of employment regulation, focused on `perverse' inflexibilities, reductions in
productivity and burdensome costs (Hurrell, 2005; Marlow, 2006; Mason et al, 2006).
Despite these concerns, recent research has reported that the actual effect of
regulation, although highly complex to assess, appears to be minimal (Athayde et al,
2006). Studies of the impact of employment regulation in UK small firms have shown
that there is little principled opposition to extending employment rights (Harris, 2002)
and that the actual effects of regulation `` are quite rare'' (Edwards et al, 2004, page 245).
In a small-scale, qualitative analysis of eighteen case firms, Edwards et al identified four
factorsöperceptions, lack of uniformity, mediating conditions, and informalityöthat
explained why, given the prevailing concerns about excessive regulation, the `` impact in
practice is often less than rhetoric suggests'' (page 265).
We seek to contribute to the debate regarding the effect of regulation on small
business by exploring whether the propositions advanced by Edwards et al (2004) can
be given empirical support within a very large sample of nearly 17 000 UK small firms.
Following this introduction we review some of the key analyses investigating the effect
of legislation on small businesses. This is followed by a description of the methodology
and approach adopted in this study. The results of the study are then reported using
Edwards et al's (2004) fourfold explanation as the template for structuring discussion.
Finally, conclusions are drawn and implications for future research and policy are
suggested.
Regulation and the small business sector
Economic theory suggests that government intervention is required to correct market
imperfections and enhance efficiency in complex market economies (Athayde et al,
2006; Small Business Research Centre, 2005; van der Horst et al, 2000). In recent
decades the economic rationale for regulationöcorrecting market inefficienciesöhas
been expanded to include social, humanitarian, and environmental considerations,
reflecting societal demands `` for more and more protection and fairness in increasingly
wealthy and complex societies'' (Bannock, 2006, page 79). The consequence is a ratch-
eted increase in the volume and scope of regulatory policies (Bannock, 2006; Bennett,
2006; van der Horst et al, 2000).
A recurrent finding of many studies investigating perceived constraints on small
business growth is the view that compliance with government regulations imposes a
major and iniquitous burden (Bannock, 2006; European Commission, 2002; Schiffer
and Weder, 2001; World Bank Group, 2006). While Bannock (2006) notes the relative
paucity of small firms' research investigating the impact of regulation, the weight of
evidence suggests that there is much truth in owner ^managers' perceptions of inequitable
administrative volume and costs (Gray and Bannock, 2005).
Research has identified two main factors which lead small firms to experience
higher relative compliance costs of regulation (Bannock and Peacock, 1989; Cressy,
2000; Poutziouris et al, 2003; Sandford, 1995). Firstly, compliance costs are regressive
in so far as `` they bear most heavily on small firms'' (Bannock, 2006, page 75), as
some compliance costs are fixed and other compliance costs do not increase in propor-
tion to firm size. The result is that compliance costs as a percentage of turnover are
greater for firms with a small turnover, and decline markedly (regress) as turnover
size increases (Bennett, 2006). Secondly, small firms fail to benefit from the advantages
of being able to influence the design of regulation which tends to accrue to large
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organisations and specialist producer groups. Large organisations and industry groups
are able to c`apture' the regulators, in order to influence the design of regulations that
favour their interests and abilities. The relative lack of influence by small firms in the
design of regulation adds a further potential iniquity to the small firms sector (Bannock,
2006; Bennett, 2006; Berney and Owens, 1985).
Research investigating the regulatory compliance costs of small businesses distin-
guishes direct costs (physical equipment, also the costs of delays and lost production)
and administrative compliance costs (time spent on paperwork) that are borne by the
business, from excess burdens (efficiency costs or deadweight losses) which are costs to
the economy (Bannock, 2006). Estimates of the overall compliance costs of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) suggest these equate to 3 ^ 4% of gross domestic
product (European Commission, 1995), while the costs to small firms average 4% of
turnover (OECD, 2001). Research also demonstrates the regressive nature of compli-
ance costs, with smaller firms disproportionately affected with costs declining rapidly
as firm size increases (Bennett, 2006; Chittenden et al, 2003; Cressy, 2000; Sandford,
1995; Sommers and Cole, 1985).
Compliance costs vary between types of regulation. Bannock and Peacock (1989)
identified six broad areas of government regulations that potentially give rise to higher
compliance costs for small firms: employment protection; collection and payment of
taxes and grants; health and safety; provision of information; other laws, such as
planning, consumer laws, and company reporting requirements; and industry-specific
regulations. While many surveys of small business owner ^managers emphasise the
time-intensive costs of taxation compliance (Bannock, 2006; Chittenden et al, 2003;
Cressy, 2000), Bennett (2006) argues that
‘‘compliance costs with labour market directives tend to be more costly than
taxation requirements, which are in turn more costly than licensing processes''
(page 53).
While the relative costs of regulatory streams may be debated, there is general unanimity
for the view that compliance costs as a whole are increasing as regulation expands.
While governments have been responsible for adding to the regulatory burden on
small firms, they have also recognised the need to reduce the impact of these `burdens'
on small firm owner ^managers (OECD, 2001; Schiffer and Weder, 2001; van der Horst
et al, 2000), a stance strongly advocated by business lobby groups (Edwards et al, 2004).
Governmental attempts to reduce the administrative burdens on smaller firms have
existed, in the modern era, since at least the 1950s (Sommers and Cole, 1985). By the
mid-1990s, fourteen of the EU15 countries had either implemented or planned reduc-
tions in administrative burdens including simplification of existing regulations, reduction
in regulatory requirements, and greater transparency in tax systems (ENSR, 1997; van der
Horst et al, 2000). More recently, the World Bank reported administrative and regulatory
reforms in 112 countries between 2005 and 2006 (World Bank Group, 2006). Despite
these efforts, there exists a contradictory and much greater pressure towards an expan-
sion of government regulation of economic and business activity, one of `` the primary
tasks of government'' (van der Horst et al, 2000, page 132).
Given these continual pressures towards regulatory expansion, some consideration
should be afforded to understanding how small firms have managed to accommodate
regulation which is both increasing in volume and scope, and regressive in its effects.
An early analysis of small business compliance costs hypothesised a tension between
incurring the costs of full compliance and
‘‘taking the risk of not fully complying or avoiding information about requirements,
hoping to escape un-noticed or unchallenged by regulatory authorities'' (Sommers
and Cole, 1985, page 701).
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As predicted, small firms reported higher mean compliance costs than large firms and,
while few small firms actively avoided compliance, there was greater variation between
small firms as a result of differences in compliance strategies (Sommers and Cole,
1985).
More recent analyses have highlighted the variable effects of regulation on small
businesses (Athayde et al, 2006; Edwards et al, 2004; Small Business Research Centre,
2005). Not only does regulation vary between industry sectors, the ability of firms to
adapt to regulatory demands also varies according to their individual abilities and
`absorptive capacity' (Athayde et al, 2006). Extending the discussion of regulation
beyond the conventional focus upon cost constraints, Athayde et al (2006) identified
regulations as potentially enabling, motivating, or constraining tendencies that operate
either directly or indirectly on small firms and which `` influence, though do not
determine, performance outcomes'' (page v). The effect of regulation on businesses
was found to be mediated by context, internal business capabilities, and broader
market conditions to `` generate novel and unpredictable business performance effects''
(page viii).
While most research has focused on the costs and effects of government regulation,
recent attention has also focused on the growth in certain sectors of increasingly
rigorous private standards which are used to both enforce and extend existing regula-
tions (public standards) (Loader and Hobbs, 1999; O'Rourke, 2003; Reardon and
Farina, 2001; Vieira, 2004). Within food production industries, for example, already
stringent governmental regulation has been extended by the private standards enforced
on their suppliers by large-scale processors and retail multiples. While there are many
incentives for small-scale suppliers, compliance with private standards is a precarious
investment for small producers given the lack of contracts or purchase guarantees and
the risks of asset specificity (Vieira, 2004). As Athayde et al (2006) point out with
regard to government regulation, compliance with private standards offers small firms
the opportunity for firm-level adaptations that, for some, may result in enhanced
performance and growth, but which, for others, may be beyond their absorptive
capacity, given prevailing market conditions.
Contrary to the prevailing views of regulatory burden, the detailed case evidence
provided by Edwards et al (2004) suggests that employment regulation had resulted in
remarkably few adverse effects within a variety of small firm contexts. Analysing data
from eighteen case companies operating in three different sectors (management con-
sultancy, care homes, and manufacturing), Edwards et al (2004) proposed four reasons
why employment regulation did `` not damage small firms'' (page 245). Firstly, they
argued that distinctions can be drawn between perceived potential effects which may
be widely reported and actual experience which may be limited to a much smaller
number of firms. Secondly, regulations are not uniformly perceived as being prob-
lematic, as some older laws: for example, statutory maternity leave, have become
``taken for granted'' and ``routinised''. Thirdly, the effect of legislation is mediated
by competitive conditions, a factor also identified by Athayde et al (2006), which are
likely to be more important influences on firm performance. Fourthly, as Vickers et al
(2005) also suggested, a degree of informality tends to ease small firms' responses to
regulation.
The purpose of this study is to provide a provide a quantitative-based examina-
tion of both the perceptions of regulation and the actual experiences of specific items
of employment regulation, within a very large sample of UK small firms using the
framework developed by Edwards et al (2004). Specifically, our objectives are to
investigate:
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(1) the extent to which broad perceptions of legislation held by small businesses match
the actual experience of being affected by employment regulation;
(2) whether long-established items of employment legislation, such as maternity leave,
have a lesser effect on small firms in comparison with newer items of legislation;
(3) the extent to which competitive and sectoral conditions mediate the effect of
employment legislation in small firms;
(4) whether a level of informality eases the effect of employment regulation in small
firms.
Methodology
Data for this study were drawn from a large-scale biennial survey of small business
attitudes and opinions undertaken on behalf of the Federation of Small Businesses
(FSB), a voluntary membership association of independent business owners in the UK.
The sampling frame consisted of the FSB membership list. This was the fourth biennial
FSB survey undertaken by the authors. Questionnaires designed by the authors in
conjunction with FSB staff attempted to elicit small business attitudes and opinions
to a wide range of contemporary issues, including attitudes towards the small business
regulatory environment and the effects of employment legislation (Carter et al, 2006).
Questionnaires were distributed to 169 418 FSB members in September 2005. By the
November 2005 cut-off date, 18 939 responses were received, a usable response rate of
11.17%. Cost restrictions prevented follow-up mailings to boost response rates, and
data protection restrictions on the mailing list prevented the research team from
identifying and contacting nonrespondents in order to investigate response bias. With-
out the option of conventional nonresponse bias tests, a comparison of early and late
responses was used to test response bias. No significant differences were found between
early and late responses across any of the variables typically used to describe the
owners and the firms [age of owner, business entry mode, age of business, sales
volume, and value-added tax (VAT) registration]. An analysis of respondents with
regard to their sectoral and regional distribution suggested a sample with close
similarities to that of the total population of UK VAT registered SMEs (ONS, 2005;
Small Business Service, 2005)
Investigating the effects of regulation in small businesses drew from two sets of
questions. The first set of questions explored the actual firm-level effects of six specific
items of workplace legislation: the Disability Discrimination Act (1995; 2005) (DDA);
flexible working legislation; maternity leave; paternity leave; parental leave; and work-
ing time regulations. Respondents were offered four alternative self-assessed measures
of effect: (1) `negatively affected', (2) `not at all affected', (3) `positively affected', and (4)
`not relevant'. The second set of questions explored broad perceptions of the regulatory
regime, using seven elements: volume of legislation; complexity of legislation; rate of
change; interpretation; inspection regime; enforcement regime; and compliance costs.
The Likert-type response scale measured responses from (2) `very satisfied' to (6) `very
dissatisfied', and was supplemented by a (1) `not relevant' response category.
To improve the relevance of the study, respondents with less than one full-time
equivalent employee (FTE) were excluded from the analysis, reducing the usable
sample by 2160 cases to 16779 respondents (including those with partial employment
data as well as those with less than 1 FTE). While this represents a large loss of data,
such caution was considered an important step in improving the robustness of
the results. Businesses that employ only the owner ^manager rarely have to consider the
consequences of employment regulation designed to protect the working conditions
and entitlements of employees. Respondents were grouped into employment size
categories (1, 2 ^ 4, 5 ^ 9, 10 ^ 19, 20 ^ 49, 50 ^ 99, and 100+) based on FTEs using the
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conventional ratios (full time1, part time 0.5, casual/seasonal 0.25). Businesses in the
1 FTE category contained at least two part-time workers or a combination of part-time
and casual workers that collectively totalled 1 FTE and up to, but not including, 2 FTEs.
Results
Perceptions versus experience of regulation
Edwards et al (2004) suggest that the actual effects of employment regulation in small
firms are overstated, with widespread perceptions of the potentially negative effects of
regulation among small business owners often being taken as evidence of actual effects.
In this study, clear distinctions were drawn between small business owners' perceptions
of the regulatory regime and the actual incidences in which small businesses had been
affected, either positively or negatively, by specific items of legislation.
As expected, the results demonstrate high levels of perceived dissatisfaction among
small business owners across all of the elements that comprise the regulatory regime
(table 1). Over half of the respondents reported some level of dissatisfaction (either
`dissatisfied' or `very dissatisfied') with the complexity of legislation, the volume of
legislation, the rate of change of legislation, and the cost of compliance. Just under
half of all small business owners reported some level of dissatisfaction with the inter-
pretation of legislation, and just under one third reported dissatisfaction with the
enforcement regime and the inspection regime. These results contrast with the remark-
ably low levels of perceived satisfaction with the regulatory regime, which accounted
for between 2% and 5% of respondents across the seven elements.While small business
owners' perceived dissatisfaction with government regulation has been widely reported,
the results reported in table 1 suggest that a substantial proportion of small business
owners do not have strong views, either negative or positive, on this issue. The number
of respondents reporting neutral responses ranged from 16% to 34.7% across the seven
elements, while those reporting nonrelevance ranged from 9% to 11.3%. The number of
nonresponses to this question was also relatively high, ranging from 15.4% to 19.8%,
providing a further indication of the lack of strong views regarding the regulatory
regime.
Table 1. Small business owners' perceptions of regulation.
Legislation Very Dissatis- Neutral Satisfied Very Non- Not
elements dissatis- fied (%) (%) (%) satisfied response relevant
fied (%) (%) (%) (%)
Volume of 30.8 23.7 17.9 2.0 0.7 15.4 9.5
legislation
Complexity of 33.7 23.1 16.0 1.7 0.6 16.0 9.0
legislation
Rate of change 30.7 21.9 18.7 1.5 0.6 17.5 9.0
of legislation
Interpretation 28.4 22.1 19.8 1.8 0.6 18.2 9.0
of legislation
Inspection regime 15.4 14.6 34.7 3.8 0.5 19.8 11.3
Enforcement 17.1 14.6 33.8 3.2 0.5 19.8 11.0
regime
Cost of 32.5 20.5 18.8 1.4 0.6 16.6 9.6
compliance
with legislation
Note: n  16 779; Likert-type response scale (2  very dissatisfied; 6  very satisfied).
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In contrast to the relatively high proportions of business owners reporting perceived
dissatisfaction with the regulatory regime, only a small minority reported being
affected by specific items of employment legislation (table 2). Maternity leave provi-
sion, the item of employment legislation most reported as having a negative effect, was
cited by just 10.6% of respondents. The remaining items of legislation were cited as
having a negative effect by fewer respondents: 8.1% cited the DDA; 6.1% cited flexible
working legislation; 8.2% cited paternity leave; 6.3% cited parental leave; and 9.0%
cited working time legislation. In contrast, a large majority of business owners were
unaffected by specific items of employment legislation and reported a `not relevant' or
`not at all affected' response. Excluding those cases with missing values on this ques-
tion, the proportion of businesses reporting a not relevant or not at all affected
response varied from 86% for maternity leave to 92% in the case of parental leave.
It is possible that the inclusion of nonresponses would further increase the proportion
of businesses reporting a neutral impact of legislation. As previous studies have noted
(Athayde et al, 2006; Edwards et al, 2004), the impact of employment legislation is
sometimes, though rarely, perceived as being positive rather than negative. In this study
the proportion of respondents who regarded employment legislation as having a
positive effect ranged from 1.6% in the case of parental leave to 5.1% in the case of
the DDA (table 2).
Newer versus older regulation
Edwards et al's (2004) second explanation of why employment legislation does not
damage small businesses relates to the age of the legislation. Their thesis is that some
items of employment legislation are so long established that their effect within the
small business sector has become routinised, largely taken for granted, and thus has
only a minimal effect. The case of statutory maternity provision was cited as a specific
example of long-standing and routinised legislation that had been widely adopted and
which presents few significant obstacles to small firms. Edwards et al (2004) predicted
that small firms' discontent with regard to employment legislation would be focused on
newer items of legislation rather than long-standing and well-established laws.
Table 2. Small business owners' experience of regulation.
Has your business been affected Negatively Positively Not Not Total
by the following legislation? at all relevant
Disability Discrimination Act
N 1 241 778 11 365 1 847 15 231
% 8.1 5.1 74.6 12.1 100
Flexible working
N 911 398 11 486 2 185 14 980
% 6.1 2.7 76.7 14.6 100
Maternity leave
N 1 620 504 10 736 2 381 15 241
% 10.6 3.3 70.4 15.6 100
Paternity leave
N 1239 351 10 993 2 450 14 033
% 8.2 2.3 73.1 16.3 100
Parental leave
N 930 231 11 246 2 411 14 818
% 6.3 1.6 75.9 16.3 100
Working time
N 1 354 339 11 178 2 146 15 017
% 9.0 2.3 74.4 14.3 100
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Of the six items of employment legislation included in this survey, only maternity
entitlement could be considered a long-established item, albeit one which has been
subject to almost continual amendment that has expanded the original provision. The
DDA was passed into law more than ten years ago, but its effect on the small business
sector was expanded in the new act passed in 2005. The remaining items of legislation
included in this survey are relatively new and could, therefore, be considered items of
specific and recent concern to small business owners.
Edwards et al (2004) did not predict a precise correlation between the age of
legislation and its effects on small businesses. Nevertheless, it is notable that there
appears to be no apparent relationship between the age of legislation and its reported
negative or positive effect on small businesses within this survey. As table 2 indicates,
the items of legislation most frequently reported as having a negative effect are
maternity leave (the most long-established item), working time regulation (1998), and
the DDA (1995 and 2005). While this result appears to refute Edwards et al's (2004)
assertions drawn from eighteen case firms, the size of the sample in this study permits
further exploratory investigation of the small business effects of legislation over time.
While no relationship was found between age of legislation and its effect on small
businesses which could support Edwards et al's (2004) thesis, a strong correlation was
found between the length of time that the respondent had owned the business and the
respondents' experience of legislation. Table 3 presents results of an analysis of means
calculated on the effects of legislation by firm age. Total mean effects were calculated
across the six items of employment legislation (0 no item of legislation had an effect,
6 six items of legislation had an effect) and calculated for all 16 903 cases. Analysis of
variance showed that all were significantly different at the 0.01% level. As the length
of time as owner of the business increases, the mean number of respondents reporting
that they been negatively affected also increases, modestly but incrementally, from
0.1374 for business owners of less than 1 year, to 0.5779 for business owners of more
than 30 years. Interestingly, the mean of respondents reporting that they had been
positively affected also increases, modestly but incrementally, as length of time as a
business owner increases, from 0.1038 for business owners of less than 1 year, to 0.2011
for business owners of more than 30 years. Correspondingly, as the length of time
owning this business increases, the mean number of respondents reporting that they
had been not at all affected decreases, from 4.2511 for business owners of less than
1 year, to 3.3615 for business owners of more than 30 years.
While Edwards et al (2004) suggested that the effect of employment legislation was
reduced over time as it becomes incorporated within a small business's routines, these
results indicate an alternative insight into the role of time and the effect of legislation.
Table 3. Mean effects of employment legislation by years in business.
How many years have Negatively Positively Not at all Not
you owned this business? affected affected affected relevant
Less than 1 year 0.1374 0.1038 4.2511 0.8654
1 – 3 years 0.2645 0.1425 4.2136 0.8673
4 – 5 years 0.3848 0.1442 4.0882 0.8031
6 – 10 years 0.4557 0.1443 4.0879 0.7780
11 – 20 years 0.4975 0.1601 3.8725 0.7507
21 – 30 years 0.5532 0.1631 3.6384 0.7601
Over 30 years 0.5779 0.2011 3.3615 0.7767
Total 0.4296 0.1530 3.9522 0.7922
Note: six items of employment legislation; 0  no items affected, 6  all items affected.
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It can be inferred from table 3 that, as the length of time owning the business increases,
so does the potential for direct exposure to items of legislation. Rather than the effects
of legislation being minimised over time as its implementation becomes a taken-
for-granted management routine, these results demonstrate a strong potential for the
effects of legislation to have a cumulative effect (negative or positive) on small business
owners over time as their window of exposure increases. Thus, a relationship was found
between legislation and time, but it is rather different to that proposed by Edwards et al
(2004), and predicated on the potential for exposure to employment legislation effects
increasing over time, rather than legislation effects diminishing over time as a result of
routinisation.
The effect of competitive conditions
Edwards et al's (2004) third proposition for the reason why employment legislation
does not affect small businesses identified competitive conditions as being a more
important influence on firms than regulation. Viewing employment legislation as a
resource cost, it was argued that the effect of regulations could be more easily
absorbed where competitive conditions are relatively benign, while in more competitive
environments regulations could exacerbate already intensely competitive sectoral pres-
sures. Edwards et al (2004) noted that certain pressures are common across each
sector, although individual firms may differ dramatically as a consequence of relative
resource endowments.
To investigate this thesis we measured competitive conditions and firm-level
responses, using self-reported firm-level data on competitive strengths and weaknesses.
Using a five-point Likert-type scale, respondents indicated the extent to which twelve
different aspects of their business were regarded as competitive strengths or weak-
nesses. A factor analysis generated three scales with reliabilities of higher than 0.6,
which grouped together eight of these aspects (table 4). Four items (`product/service
quality', `reputation', c`ustomer service, and `quality of staff ') loaded onto the first
factor, indicating a strategic approach emphasising quality, service, and reputation.
Two items [`research and design (R&D) innovation' and `flair, design, and creativity']
loaded onto the second factor, indicating a strategic approach emphasising crea-
tivity, R&D, and design. The third factor indicated firms that had responded to their
competitive environment by adopting a low-cost, low-price strategy.
A strategic emphasis on quality, service, and reputation implies a greater endow-
ment of resources such as human, social, and financial capital. Firms competing on
Table 4. Competitive strengths and weaknesses: scale construction.
Scale label Items Reliability
Quality, service, reputation Product/service quality 0.760
Reputation
Customer service
Quality of staff
Creativity, R&D, design R&D innovation 0.605
Flair design and creativity
Low cost, low price Costs 0.616
Selling price
Isolated items not in any scale Specialised expertise or products
Distribution channels
Environmental friendliness
Cash flow/financial performance
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their quality, service, and reputational strengths may be expected to absorb the
assumed burden of regulation and its associated resource costs more easily than other
firms and, therefore, report fewer negative effects associated with regulation. Similarly,
a strategic response that emphasises a firm's R&D innovation, creativity, and design
competencies implies a relatively resource-rich enterprise that competes on its distinc-
tive human and social capital and has the financial capital to invest in new product and
service offerings. These firms would also be expected to take in their stride the
administrative burden imposed by regulation. In contrast, a strategic emphasis on
low costs and low selling price indicates an intensely competitive environment in which
resource-constrained firms, as Edwards et al (2004) argued, may find their already
unenviable situation exacerbated by the imposition of regulation. Based on Edwards
et al's (2004) thesis, this group of firms were expected to report low levels of satisfac-
tion with the regulatory regime and higher than average negative effects of employment
regulation. This summary of competitive strengths and weaknesses was used in an
overall regression analysis (shown in table 5).
For the regression analyses, the dependent variables were (1) a composite measure
of overall average satisfaction with aspects of the regulatory regime, and (2) the
negative effects of employment regulation (as described in table 2). The correlations
between the seven satisfaction items that comprise the regulatory regime were quite
high. For the 10 928 respondents who answered all the items in this question, a factor
analysis showed that 73% of the variance was attributable to the only factor with an
eigenvector of greater than 1. A reliability analysis gave a coefficient alpha of 0.94. A
composite measure was calculated for overall satisfaction with the regulatory regime.
This was the average of at least two nonmissing issues from the seven. The average
rating was 3.02 (dissatisfied 3) and the number of cases was 13 028. Three groups of
independent variables were selected: the three scales for the competitive strengths and
Table 5. Multiple regressions predicting average satisfaction and negative effects of employment
legislation.
Betas Average Number of
satisfaction negative effects
Quality, service, reputation ÿ0.003 0.007
Creativity, R&D, design ÿ0.022* 0.008
Low cost, low price ÿ0.035*** 0.067***
Agriculture ÿ0.025* 0.002
Mining and utilities 0.003 0.011
Manufacturing ÿ0.031 0.030
Construction ÿ0.041* 0.010
Retail, wholesale, and motor trades ÿ0.011 0.031
Hotels and restaurants ÿ0.052*** 0.072***
Transport and communication ÿ0.029* 0.056***
Financial services ÿ0.094*** 0.038***
Business services 0.000 0.050**
Education 0.019 0.035***
Health and social work 0.000 0.052***
Personal services 0.004 0.040***
How many years have you owned this business? ÿ0.188*** 0.063***
Total employed at present ÿ0.108*** 0.304***
Interaction between years and employment size 0.022* 0.068***
Adjusted R
2
0.076 0.126
Number of cases 9 508 11 824
* Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
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weaknesses (note that the competitive strengths and weaknesses are scored so that high
values indicate weakness), indicator variables for sector, and the years in business and
employment size variables. To this last group was added an interaction variable to
search for any influence of the two variables in combination. The goodness of fit,
indicated by the adjusted R
2
, is poor for both regressions. Nevertheless, the pattern
of influence is still worth interpreting as the poor fit may only indicate measurement
error in some of the variables.
In the first regression, the betas show the direction and relative influence on
average satisfaction with the regulatory regime. Contrary to expectation, firms that
emphasise a competitive strategy of `low costs and low price' and those that emphasise
a strategy of c`reativity, R&D, and design' were more likely to be satisfied with the
regulatory regime. As Edwards et al (2004) suggested, variations were found between
industry sectors, with firms operating in agriculture, construction, hotels and restau-
rants, transport and communication, and financial services being less satisfied than
average. Business owners who had been in business for a greater number of years
were less satisfied with the regulatory regime, as were those who employed more
staff. Interestingly, while both years in business and larger staff numbers were both
significant (negative) predictors of satisfaction with the regulatory regime, the inter-
action measures indicate that the combination of the two factors reduces the amount
of negative effect of the combination of the two.
The second regression attempts to explain the negative effects of employment
regulation. With regard to competitive strengths and weakness, firms that emphasise
a `low-cost and low-price' strategy were less likely to report the negative effects of
employment regulation. With regard to industry sectors, firms most likely to report
negative effects of employment regulation were those operating in the hotels and
restaurants, transport and communication, financial services, education, health
and social work, and personal services sectors. With regard to the size and age
variables, firms that employed more staff reported more negative effects of employ-
ment regulation, as did business owners who had been in business for a greater number
of years. The interaction indicates that the combination of above average on both vari-
ables produces more negative effects than you would expect by adding the individual
effect of each. Correspondingly, if a firm is both small and new it would have even less
negative effects than would be predicted from the combination of the two individual
variables.
These analyses provide some insights into the nature of small firm responses to the
overall regulatory regime and a greater understanding of which small firms are likely
to suffer the negative effects of employment regulation. Small firms' competitive
strengths and weaknesses to some extent influence both their responses to the regu-
latory regime and the negative effects of employment regulation. The firms most likely
to be satisfied with the regulatory regime and suffer least negative effects of employ-
ment regulation are those that emphasise a `low-cost, low-price' strategy. This result is
difficult to explain, and may simply reflect variations in compliance strategies, as noted
by Sommers and Cole (1985), with this particular group of cost-constrained firms
`undercomplying' relative to other firms and thus managing to avoid the negative
effects of regulation.
As Edwards et al (2004) suggested, different industry sectors have varying levels of
regulation and therefore may be expected to experience differently the effects of both
the overall regulatory regime and specific items of employment regulation. In support
of this, firms operating in sectors in which there is a large overall regulatory regime
which is manifested in explicit sector-level regulatory interventions (agriculture, con-
struction, hotels and restaurants, transport and communication, financial services)
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were less likely to be satisfied with the overall regulatory regime. Sectors most likely to
report negative effects of employment regulation, not surprisingly, were those in which
there is a tendency for labour intensity (hotels and restaurants, transport and commu-
nication, financial services, business services, education, health and social work, and
personal services). While there is some overlap between sectors reporting lower than
average levels of satisfaction with the regulatory regime and those reporting negative
effects of employment regulation, the two dependent variables (regulatory regime,
negative effects of employment regulation) provide two distinctive patterns of results.
Three sectors reported lower than average satisfaction with the regulation regime and
significantly higher negative effects of employment regulation (hotels and restaurants,
transport and communication, financial services). Edwards et al (2004) argued that the
effects of the regulation regime within certain strongly regulated sectors may spill over
into employment regulation, as generic regulation pressures lead to cost constraints,
which, in turn, strengthen the impact of employment regulation. It is possible that this
argument explains the responses of these three sectors; however, it is notable that in
two heavily regulated sectors (agriculture and construction) there is no such spillover,
while four sectors (business services, education, health and social work, and personal
services) report significantly more negative effects of employment regulation, without
reporting less than average satisfaction with the generic regulatory regime.
The strongest influences on satisfaction with the regulatory regime and negative
effects of employment regulation are years in business and number of employees,
respectively. As noted earlier, length of time as a business owner increases the oppor-
tunity for exposure to regulation. Similarly, more employees also increase the likelihood
of experiencing negative effects of employment regulation. Nevertheless, the interaction
between age and employment size and its effects on regulation experiences within an
individual firm is complex. As firms age and grow in employment numbers, systems are
introduced that enable the effects of regulation to be managed and routinised. Business
growth, the typical precursor to employment growth, brings additional managerial
challenges, including the need to manage the effects of regulation, but also brings com-
pensatory financial rewards. Thus, being in business for a longer number of years and
having a larger number of employees individually increase exposure to regulation
and the possibility of negative effects, but when both factors are present the effects
appear to be muted, perhaps offset by routinisation and enhanced performance.
Does informality ease regulation?
The fourth proposition advanced by Edwards et al (2004) to explain why small firms
are `not damaged' by employment regulation focused on the role of informality in
mediating the effects of legislation. In this study, degree of organisational formality
was measured using employment size as a proxy. While there is some debate surround-
ing the use of organizational size as a proxy for other variables, Kalleberg and Van
Buren (1996) note clear differences in employment practices between large and small
firms:
‘‘Large organizations are more concerned than are small organisations with legiti-
mating their personnel practices and compensation policies by conforming to
accepted principles of human resource management. ... Large organizations often
have more formalized relations with their employees'' (page 49).
As Atkinson and Curtis (2004) reported, an informal `paternalistic' approach to
employee relations remains largely intact within the small firms sector, while Storey's
(1994) review of the small firms research literature also identified clear organisational
size threshold effects with regard both to employment practices and the relations
between the organisation and its institutional environment.
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Table 6 reports the effects of employment regulation by firm size, based on means
calculated for regulation effect. The number of respondents reporting being negatively
affected by employment regulation increases incrementally with firm size. The number
of respondents reporting being positively affected by employment regulation also
increases incrementally as firm size increases. Conversely, the number of respondents
reporting that employment regulation is `not relevant' or reporting being `not at all'
affected by employment regulation decreases as employment size increases. A strong
linear component was found in the analysis of variance F
1; 4
 147:5, p < 0:001. These
results support Edwards et al's (2004) assertion that a degree of informality mediates
the effects of employment regulation within small firms.
Edwards et al (2004) also comment on the relative rarity with which small firms
report the positive effects of regulation. While Edwards et al (2004) drew their results
from eighteen in-depth case studies, the results of this very large-scale survey confirm
the relative rarity of reported positive effects. While the positive effects of employment
regulation were seldom reported, it is notable that the number of respondents reporting
positive effects increases by employment size up to the 50 ^ 99 employee size band,
but drops to 0.23 for businesses with more than 100 FTEs.
Conclusions
The research literature analysing the impact of regulation on small firms is mainly
derived from two different subject domains; the first emanates from human resources
(HR) and the second from entrepreneurship and small business management. The HR
literature tends to focus on the employee, arguing that regulation is desirable and
beneficial in employee protection and that its adverse impact on the firm is overstated.
The entrepreneurship literature, however, sees regulation as regressive and imposing
greater burdens on small firms than on large firms. We seek to unite these two
approaches, providing a quantitative analysis of small firms to examine the four
propositions offered by Edwards et al (2004) to explain why employment legislation
does not damage small firms.
Firstly, we support Edwards et al (2004) in finding high levels of perceived dissat-
isfaction with the general regulatory regime, which vary with the length of time that the
owner ^manager has owned the business, industry sector, and employment size. The
probable explanation for this incremental increase in dissatisfaction with the regula-
tory regime is that experienced business owners may recall the ease with which they
were able to conduct business in a less regulated environment. Unlike owners whose
business ownership careers have been shorter, those with more experience have a
Table 6. Employment regulation effects and informality (employment size).
Employment Number of items of legislation
size (full-time
equivalent) negative effect positive effect not at all not relevant
1 0.0985 0.0879 4.2062 1.1040
2 – 4 0.1906 0.0965 4.1988 0.9100
5 – 9 0.5057 0.1690 3.8551 0.6736
10 – 19 0.8495 0.2421 3.5681 0.5489
20 – 49 1.2012 0.3639 3.1610 0.4598
50 – 99 1.6586 0.4699 2.8715 0.2771
100 2.3377 0.2338 2.2857 0.2727
Total 0.4301 0.1533 3.9500 0.7911
Note: Six items of employment legislation; 0  no items affected; 6  all items affected.
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yardstick against which to judge the current regulatory regimeöalbeit, their recall may
be nostalgic and inaccurate. An alternative explanation may be that, for more expe-
rienced business owners, their growing intolerance of regulation masks other business
pressures associated with age, including competitive intensity from new and more
modern firms, the liabilities of stale resources, and considerations about future retire-
ment and exit. Owner ^managers rarely differentiate between different elements of the
regulatory regime, tending to view all aspects as equally dissatisfying. Nevertheless,
despite perceived dissatisfaction, few report being directly affected by workplace
regulation, indicating prima facie support for Edwards et al's (2004) assertion that
perceptions of effects tend to be `` broad and general, rather than reflections of concrete
experience'' (page 245).
Secondly, we find no support for the suggestion by Edwards et al (2004) that
longstanding items of workplace legislationöfor example maternity provisionöhad
become taken for granted and routinised within small businesses, the effects mitigated
by the age of the legislation and its commonplace acceptance. Indeed, the contrary
was found. Maternity leave, the oldest item of legislation considered in this survey, was
most frequently cited as having a negative effect. Results from this large-scale survey
indicate a relationship between length of time as a business owner and the reporting of
negative regulatory effects. Rather than regulation being mitigated by age, it appears
that there is a window of exposure to regulation that increases cumulatively with length
of time as a business owner.
Thirdly, Edwards et al (2004) argued that the effects of legislation depend upon the
firm's competitive conditions.While some firms can accommodate the costs of employ-
ment regulation, in other cases regulation exacerbates preexisting pressures caused by
intensely competitive sectoral conditions. The results of the multivariate analyses
suggest that sectoral conditions and strategic dimensions certainly influence a firm's
likelihood of reporting lower than average satisfaction with the regulatory regime
and the negative effects of employment regulation. However, the strongest predictors
of regulatory dissatisfaction and negative effects are the number of years in business
and number of employees, respectively.
Finally, Edwards et al (2004) argued that informality eases responses to employ-
ment regulation within small firms. Using employment size as a proxy for the degree of
formality that exists within a firm, we found that smaller businesses are the least
affected by employment regulation and that negative effects increase with employment
size. While these results fully uphold Edwards et al's (2004) fourth explanation, they
run counter to the popular rhetoric that it is the smallest firms that are the most
negatively affected by employment regulation.
Political discourse has shaped perceptions of regulation. Small business lobby
groups and probusiness media talk up the impact of regulation to attack government
for being antibusiness. Meanwhile, both government and opposition parties promise to
reduce regulation as a means of demonstrating their pro-small-business sympathies.
The consequence of this discourse has been to distort reality, creating the perception
amongst small business owners that regulation has a significant adverse impact on the
small business sector when the reality is that its negative incidence is much more
limited. The evidence from this study suggests that the adverse impacts of regulation
are reported by a minority of business owners, primarily those who have been in
business for a long time and have therefore experienced the cumulative effects of
legislation, and those who employ a substantial number of employees. Meanwhile, the
majority of small business owners, who have been in business for only a relatively short
time and who tend to employ fewer staff, take regulation as a `given'. Accordingly,
regulation has attracted more attention than is justified by its significance. It is, of course,
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important that governments should be encouraged to produce better regulation (Bannock,
2006). However, the evidence presented here suggests that it would be more productive if
the debate on how to create a thriving enterprise economy shifted to issues that genuinely
impinge on the vitality of the small business sector.
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